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Abstract. Compromise is a valuable decision-making procedure. This paper argues that its value 
lies in the norms of reciprocity and consent. Reciprocity structures the practice of concession-
giving. Compliance with this tacit rule expresses an ethos of mutual concern and achieves a shared 
sense of fairness. Consent is a useful safeguard against asymmetric deals and makes compromise 
morally binding. The procedural value of compromise gives us important reasons to choose this 
method for resolving conflicts.  
 




Compromise is one procedure among others to make collective decisions.1 Much of recent 
discussions has focused on the morality of compromise and on its justification.2 This paper 
                                            
1 While there has been extensive discussion about some procedures, such as majority rule and deliberation, 
the literature on compromise is more modest. Alin Fumurescu, author of a conceptual genealogy of 
compromise, depicts this topic as the “most neglected by political theorists” (Fumurescu 2013, 3). Yet there 
has been increasing interest in the last decades. Specifically, Richard Bellamy presents compromise as a 
response to the pluralism of value pervading modern societies (Bellamy 1999). Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson adopts a more empirically-grounded approach to reflect upon the obstacles to compromise in 
contemporary democratic politics, in particular the United States Congress (Gutmann and Thompson 
2014). For a recent overview of  the scholarship on compromise, see Rostbøll and Scavenius (2018) and 
Knight (2018).  
2 Avishai Margalit examines what makes some compromises morally abhorrent, rotten to the core (Margalit 
2010). Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin explore what is lost morally from the standpoint of the 
compromisers engaged in joint wrongdoing (Lepora and Goodin 2013). Authors such as Simon May, Daniel 
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contributes to the latter debate by arguing that compromise has procedural value. The argument 
contrasts with a purely instrumental account of the value of compromise, focusing exclusively on 
the consequences it brings about.3 It corroborates and builds on several attempts to identify the 
principles that compromise embodies such as mutual respect and reciprocity (Bellamy and Hollis 
1998, Gutmann and Thompson 2014). The procedural value of compromise gives us important 
reasons to choose this particular way of making decisions. We value and choose procedures for a 
number of reasons, ranging from the expected quality of their outcome to the merits of the 
procedure itself (Waldron 2013). Among other things, we want our procedures to express the right 
norms and principles. This is rather evident when it comes to majority rule, praised for being a 
“respectful procedure” giving equal say to everyone  (Waldron 1999, 108-116). A similar knowledge 
of  the specific normative properties of  compromise is most needed.  
What makes compromise a valuable method of  making decisions? The answer lies in the 
specific norms underlying compromise, that is, reciprocity and consent. When agents hold 
incompatible claims, compromise is a way of addressing the conflict through a practice of 
reciprocal sacrifice aiming at securing the consent of all involved. The norm of reciprocity 
structures the practice of concession-giving. Compliance with this tacit rule expresses an ethos of 
mutual concern and achieves a shared sense of fairness. Compromise distributes the burdens in a 
way that is deemed acceptable by the parties. They consent to an agreement which becomes 
morally binding.4  
This paper begins with a conceptual account of  compromise. The second section explains the 
idea of  procedural value. The last two sections delve into the two norms at the core of  compromise, 
reciprocity and consent, and show their interrelated normative force.  
 
I. Compromise as a decision-making procedure  
 
                                            
Weinstock, Fabian Wendt, Federico Zuolo and Giulia Bistagnino discuss pragmatic and principled reasons 
to compromise in the face of political and moral disagreement (May 2005, Weinstock 2013, 2017, Wendt 
2013, 2016, Zuolo and Bistagnino 2018).  
3 This is my reading of May’s claim that the justification for moral compromise can only be pragmatic, as 
opposed to principled—the agent concedes in order to achieve a particular goal, rather than in virtue of 
principles.  
4 The norms of reciprocity and consent are not special to compromise. Other decision-making procedures 
embody them too, such as arbitration (Rouméas 2020). What is special about compromise is that the 
reciprocal sacrifice is negotiated directly by the agents themselves.  
Pre-proof version - Rouméas Élise, “The Procedural Value of Compromise”, Social Theory and 
Practice, forthcoming April 2021: https://pdcnet.org/soctheory 
 
 3 
Compromise is a decision-making procedure based on reciprocal concessions. It is essentially a 
method to reach agreement. In the academic literature, the term compromise is used to refer to 
both a process and an outcome.5  
Compromise as process is a mutual exchange of  concessions between two or more parties. It is quite 
common to situate compromise somewhere in between bargaining and deliberation.6 The key 
difference between bargaining and compromise lies in the attitude of  the parties, a strategic attitude 
in the former case and a more cooperative attitude in the latter (Benditt 1979). Bargainers do not 
share a single joint strategy, but seek to maximise their individual interest. By doing so, they may 
reach an agreement on a joint strategy. Although bargaining is a non-cooperative process, 
cooperation can stem from it (Gauthier 1986, 129). By contrast, compromisers seek a mutually 
satisfactory solution, rather than the sole triumph of  their vested interest. Even when given the 
opportunity of  an overwhelming victory, they refrain from taking full advantage from it. This can 
be justified by both principled and pragmatic reasons, from the respect owed to one’s political 
opponent to the practical necessity of  maintaining a long-term nonconflictual relationship. 
Cooperation is not merely the outcome of  compromise, instead compromise is a cooperative 
process.  
Compromise also differs from deliberation, at least when the latter is narrowly construed as an 
exchange of  reasons aimed at rational consensus. In simple terms, the success of  a deliberation 
depends on the willingness of  deliberants to change their mind. When deliberants realise that their 
premise was mistaken or that their argument does not survive rational scrutiny, they should revise 
their position accordingly or adopt an alternative view. Through a process of  revision and 
correction, deliberation may lead to consensus. The consensus reflects each participant’s now 
preferred position. There is no loss to lament, as everyone improved their views.  
Compromise works differently. Compromisers do not change their mind, but concede on their 
initial aspirations. They may remain stubborn about the correctness of  their initial position, while 
yielding part of  their claim in the hope of  securing an agreement. Concessions follow a logic of  
give-and-take. I offer to give up on this aspect that matters to you if  you accept to integrate this 
element that matters to me. A complex balancing exercise goes on until a mutually-acceptable 
agreement is reached. Ultimately, compromisers have losses to lament. They perceive the 
                                            
5 For the distinction between compromise as process and compromise as outcome, see Goldin (1979, 7). 
6 The clearest formulation of the tryptic can be found in Leydet (2006). 
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agreement to be inferior to their initial aspiration—they haven’t changed their mind about what is 
best—, but prefer the “second-best” outcome to an ongoing conflict. 
Both deliberation and compromise involve reason-giving and rational persuasion. Yet a crucial 
difference lies in the type of  reasons that is being exchanged and what they are aiming at. 
Deliberants exchange first-order reasons, namely reasons that bear on the merits of  their position 
and aim at convincing others to change their view. Compromisers, on the other hand, exchange 
second-order reasons, namely reasons that bear on whether one should hold on to one’s position 
and aim at convincing other to make concessions. 7 While deliberants explain, defend, and criticise 
substantive views, compromisers must convince each other that it is reasonable to lose a little by 
accepting the deal rather than to lose a lot by ending the discussion and remaining in conflict. To 
this end, they must also put forward convincing arguments. Both practices are indeed about reason-
giving, but what is given, and why, differs.  
However useful the threefold distinction between bargaining, compromise and deliberation is, 
it should not be overblown. Compromise does borrow features from the two other models. On the 
one hand, compromise can be construed as a thinly moralised version of  bargaining, where parties 
share a cooperative attitude instead of  a merely strategic one. On the other hand, compromise can 
be interpreted as a “realistic” subtype of  deliberation that allows for more pragmatic concerns and 
ways of  communicating.8 Broadly construed, both bargaining and deliberative practices can 
accommodate compromise as a sub-species. Yet given its hybrid nature and distinctive traits, 
compromise deserves a label of  its own.   
While compromise as process refers to the mutual exchange of  concessions, compromise as outcome 
refers to a decision situated in the zone between the conflict point and the aspiration point of  at 
least two parties. Technically, a compromise arrangement does not have to be negotiated, but could 
stem from the decision of  a third party (Benjamin 1990, 5). For the sake of  conceptual clarity, I 
                                            
7 Simon May distinguishes between reasons for moral compromise and reasons for moral correction as 
follows: “It may be helpful to think of reasons for moral correction as first-order reasons that concern the 
merits of a position itself, and reasons for moral compromise as second-order reasons that concern how 
firmly one should hold to a first-order position in the face of moral disagreement (May 2005, 319).” 
 
8 Daniel Weinstock blurs the distinction between compromise and deliberation by referring to the process 
of compromise as a deliberative practice. He argues that compromise is a better end-goal to deliberation 
than consensus, but that deliberation aiming at compromise differs in kind with deliberation aiming at 
consensus. My view does not really diverge from Weinstock’s, except that I speak of “compromise as 
process”, as opposed to deliberation aiming at compromise (Weinstock 2013). 
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suggest narrowing the definition of  a compromise outcome to the end-result of  a compromise 
process. A third-party arbitration that would find a middle ground arrangement between the claims 
of  contestants would thus not strike a compromise in this narrow sense.  
One could argue, however, that a third-party arbitration could work as a compromise, if  
resorting to this procedure involves a concession on each side. More generally, choosing a decision-
making procedure, be it voting or lottery, may involve an underlying compromise, as parties “agree 
to disagree”, give up the idea of  reaching a rational consensus, and abide with the outcome of  the 
commonly agreed method. My view on these types of  cases is that any procedure can be chosen 
by an initial compromise. As a result, a compromise outcome can well be another procedure.  
What makes a compromise special, and distinct from a consensus, is how it is perceived as a 
second-best by the parties who adhere to it. If  an agreement reflects a convergence of  interests or 
if  it is based on a common ground, it is likely to be sustained by a consensus rather than a 
compromise. A compromise also differs from a modus vivendi as defined by John Rawls, namely a 
fragile equilibrium of  antagonistic interests based solely on prudential reasons (Rawls 2005, 458-
459). A compromise is typically sustained by some moral reasons. Strategic bargaining may 
produce modus vivendi.   
I am interested in the normative frame of  the compromise process—the set of  rules that 
structures the practice. I call this procedure. There might be some intuitive resistance in calling 
compromise a procedure. As a matter of  fact, compromise is an unusual procedure, insofar as it 
relies much on informal rules and practices. Compromisers do not explicitly agree in advance of  a 
compromise to be bound by its outcome. Instead, they often enter the conversation determined to 
win an argument, and leave it embarrassed by the concessions made. Yet informal does not mean 
unstructured or trivial. Our day-to-day informal interactions with strangers obey strict conventions 
of  politeness and are constrained by interpersonal rules of  morality. Much of  what regulates our 
words or behaviours belongs to the realm of  the tacitly known. Whether we abide by these rules or 
not distinguishes a pleasant conversation from a rude interaction. Similarly, whether an informal 
agreement really is a compromise depends on compliance with some basic norms, crucially 
reciprocity and consent. They give compromise its normative value.  
 
II. A Valuable Procedure  
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Uncovering the specific normative properties of  compromise gives us some reasons to choose 
this method for resolving conflicts. It also incites us to trust the quality of  compromise outcomes, 
at least in a pro tanto way. Compromise outcomes may be all things considered wrong in light of  
procedure-independent criteria, say unfair to a third-party, or immoral. This section clarifies what 
is meant by procedural value and the connection between procedure and outcome value.  
Our evaluation of  compromise is generally outcome-oriented. We judge compromises by what 
they achieve or fail to achieve. At the very least, we want a compromise to offer a resolution to an 
ongoing conflict. Criteria of  assessment for what counts as a good or a bad compromise vary. We 
praise some compromises for being stable9, or mutually beneficial, while critiquing others for being 
unfair, or morally “rotten”.10 Different criteria lead to conflicting evaluations. A disproportionally 
asymmetric deal can achieve a stable resolution of  conflict. A morally dubious agreement can 
nevertheless improve the situation of  all parties involved. Context matters in the evaluation. Over 
time, the perception of  a compromise can evolve from a disappointing second-best to a celebrated 
consensus.  
Compromise arrangements can be assessed independently from their nature as compromise. 
Similar standards of effectiveness, fairness, or morality could well apply to voting and deliberative 
outcomes. Although the evaluation of  a compromise may be procedure-independent, one 
promising line of inquiry assesses the intrinsic quality of compromises as resulting from an 
exchange of concessions.11 Which quality do we expect decisions to have insofar as they result from 
concessions-giving? Which merits of the method translate into qualities of the outcome? What a 
compromise achieves very much depends on its genesis, the way it was shaped by conflicting 
preferences and came to be perceived as a realistic response to a conflictual deadlock.  
This is precisely what the idea of procedural value captures. There is something intrinsically 
valuable in the compromise method which generates specific reasons to choose it. This layer of 
                                            
9 A compromise may fare better in terms of stability than a “winner-takes-all” solution, given that it 
secures the agreement of all parties involved. Empirical research on non-majoritarian forms of 
democracy, such as consociational or consensus democracy, challenges the conventional view that 
majoritarian democracies are necessarily better at governing. A comparison between majoritarian 
democracies and consensus democracies also shows that the latter produces policies that are “kinder and 
gentler”, on criteria such as social expenditure and incarceration rate (Lijphart 2008). 
10 On compromise and fairness, see Wendt (2018) and Jones and O’Flynn (2013). On rotten compromises, 
see Margalit (2010). On “good compromises”, see Van Parijs (2011).  
11 Wendt adopts this approach in his reflection on the intrinsic fairness of compromise (Wendt 2018).  
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value somehow translates into the quality of the outcome. An arrangement is partly valuable by 
virtue of having been made by compromise.  
To illustrate, consider a conflict over child custody.12 A decision by compromise seems 
intuitively appealing, especially compared with the most plausible alternatives of a one-sided 
decision or a third-party arbitration. Suppose that the exact same arrangement—a specific time 
share—could be reached with the three methods. There are good reasons to choose a decision 
made by compromise, insofar as it stems from a reciprocal and consensual process. A one-sided 
decision could ignore altogether the autonomous decision-making of one of the parties. A third-
party arbitration demands consent—consenting to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator prior 
to the adjudication—, but the decision is made independently of their ongoing approval. In 
contrast, reciprocity in compromise ensures a mutual consideration of interests. Consent regulates 
the design of the solution itself and makes it morally binding. Compromisers carefully weigh their 
losses, adjust their expectations, and consent to an arrangement they co-create. Before delving into 
the specific merits of reciprocity and consent in compromise, it is possible to grasp their intuitive 
appeal in generating a decision about child custody. 
The way a decision is made matters, and compromise offers a compelling method for distinctive 
normative reasons—which boil down, in my view, to the norms of reciprocity and consent. This 
does not mean, however, that compromise is the best way to reach decisions all things considered. 
Should there be a significant asymmetry of power between the parents, the exchange of concessions 
could be corrupted by the underlying inequality. In such case, a third-party arbitration may fare 
better in ensuring a fair outcome. The nature of compromise seems to demand an initial 
compromising position of rough equality. There are good reasons to choose a reciprocal and 
consensual process, but competing considerations might override them, such as the demand of 
fairness in a context of inequality.  
Compromise remains an “impure procedure” (Rawls 1999). The value of its outcome is not a 
mere reflection of a rightly conducted procedure.13 As seen earlier, compromises can be assessed 
with a diversity of procedure-independent criteria. A compromise decision about child custody 
may have been adopted under the auspice of reciprocity and yet be strikingly unfair to one of the 
                                            
12 For a reflection on allocative disputes and child custody, see Elster (1989). 
13 By analogy with the Rawlsian category of “pure procedural justice”, this means that (1) there is no 
independent standard of value to assess compromise arrangements; (2) a “valuable” procedure produces 
“valuable” results (Rawls 1999). 
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parents, due to an underlying inequality. A good procedure does not guarantee a good outcome. 
At best, a good procedure gives us pro tanto reasons to accept its outcome, which can be all things 
considered wrong on other substantive criteria. 
No doubt that some compromises are plainly wrong. Avishai Margalit famously defines a rotten 
compromise as “an agreement to establish or maintain an inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty 
and humiliation, that is, a regime that does not treat humans as humans” (Margalit 2010, 2). 
According to Margalit, rotten compromises are the “don’ts” of political morality (Margalit 2010, 
118). Any government, any political entity shall abide to the precept: “Thou shall not commit a 
rotten compromise, come what may (Margalit 2010, 113).” Margalit presents such unconditional 
rule as a very minimal one. Political compromises are generally desirable, or at least they deserve 
a case-by-case evaluation. Some of them might well be underpinned by detestable motives and 
trade invaluable goods, but they are not systematically ruled out in Margalit’s view, as long as they 
do not authorise the atrocious synthesis between cruelty and humiliation—a state of affairs which 
is inhuman, in the sense of “unfit for humans”(Margalit 2010, 89). The wrongness of compromise 
need not be confined to compromise arrangements, it can also pervert the process; there is 
something inherently wrong about compromising on slavery.  
Procedures can be wrongly conducted or employed to serve wrong ends. In Political Theology, 
Carl Schmitt mocks liberalism for addressing fundamental issues, such as the terrible question 
“Christ or Barabbas?”, with a committee of investigation (Schmitt 2005, 62). For Schmitt, there is 
something inherently blasphemous in choosing the wrong procedure for making such a critical 
decision. The mere fact of putting the problem under collective scrutiny highlights a 
misunderstanding of what really is at stake. The practice of compromise is filled with unfortunate 
decisions, as is the practice of voting or deliberating. Some compromise processes are corrupted, 
some outcomes are rotten, but this does not contradict the idea of the procedural value of 
compromise. The next sections endeavour to describe this value.  
 
III.  The Practice of  Reciprocal Sacrifice  
 
The value of compromise qua procedure is grounded in reciprocity and consent. In my account, 
a compromise should be reciprocal. Given that not all reciprocal actions are valuable—retribution, 
for example, can be wrong and harmful— the question is what makes the reciprocity involved in 
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compromise valuable. I begin by giving an account of  the reciprocity at work in compromise before 
highlighting its value and the way it relates to consent. Let us bear in mind that reciprocity and 
consent do not function independently in the economy of  compromise. The norm of  reciprocity 
demands that concessions be voluntary and in search for the other’s consent. Reciprocity implies 
consent.  
Reciprocity crucially differs from both unilaterality and mutuality. Unilaterality refers to a one-
sided action, for example when only one camp is willing to be flexible and accommodating. A 
unilateral concession can be a generous gesture or a shameful surrender, but it does not constitute, 
properly speaking, a compromise. Unlike unilaterality, reciprocity demands that each one involved 
contributes. 
Mutuality also fails to capture the normative core of  compromise. It only captures part of  the 
picture, namely that the action of  conceding is carried out by each party vis-à-vis one another. A 
mutual action is simultaneously conducted on both sides, but need not be coordinated. Without 
coordination, mutual acts of  self-sacrifice can have unexpected consequences, as O. Henry’s short 
story “The Gift of  the Magi” powerfully illustrates.14 In this story, a poor married couple aspires 
to buy each other’s Christmas gifts. Given their state of  deprivation, they are willing to make 
significant sacrifices. The young wife secretly decides to cut her long hair to buy a chain for her 
husband’s watch. Meanwhile, her husband resolves to sell his watch to buy a comb for his wife’s 
hair. Non-coordinative mutual sacrifice sadly results here in a collective loss—and a tragic irony. 
Unlike mutuality, reciprocity includes coordination and conditionality: “I concede because you 
concede”.15  
The social norm of  reciprocity governs the way we respond to other people’s actions, whether 
positive or negative, beneficial or harmful (Becker 1986). It structures a great deal of  social 
practices, such as the logic of  gift giving, solidarity, trade, retribution, etc. Reciprocity works 
because it creates moral expectations and feelings of  indebtedness. Who has given expects to 
receive in return. Who has received feels she must return the favour. Yet reciprocity does not 
pervade all moral reasoning. In fact, non-reciprocation sometimes appears as a hallmark of  higher 
morality. Consider the precept of  the New Testament that exhorts to turn the other cheek 
                                            
14 Quoted by Golding (1979, 12).  
15 I rely here on David Gauthier’s definition: “a practice is co-ordinative if each person prefers to conform 
to it provided (most) others do, but prefers not conform to it provided (most) others do not.” (Gauthier 1986, 
10) 
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(Matthew, 3:38). Being merciful and forgiving implies to stand above what crude reciprocity 
demands. The beauty of  such gestures, if  any, resides in the active refusal to return evil for evil. 
Reciprocity can serve ambivalent ends, and some moral actions involve the active refusal to 
reciprocate. This has very much to do with the moral content of  what is returned. Returning a 
harm appropriately may not repair the harm done, but create further harm.  
The general concept of  reciprocity calls for a “fitting and proportional” response to what has 
been received (Becker 2005). Whilst the general social norm remains rather indeterminate, specific 
conceptions of  reciprocity spell out various standards defining what an appropriate response is 
(Becker 2005). For instance, a specific conception determines whether reciprocity demands a strict 
equivalency between goods received and returned, or a relation of  proportionality (White 2003, 
Becker 2005, Gould 1988). The specific rule of  proportionality that reciprocity-in-compromise 
demands ought to remain largely undefined. Specifying a guiding ethical principle that 
compromisers should follow to ensure fairness in compromise would betray the very nature of  the 
social practice. Through progressive adjustments, trial and error, and reshaping of  their 
expectations, compromisers reach an appropriate and proportionate solution, for which each 
appears to have conceded sufficiently. They work out what reciprocity demands. The norm of  
reciprocity cannot be fully specified outside of  the practice. In fact, specifying it fully would make 
the practice itself  redundant.  
Two key features of  reciprocity-in-compromise can be identified. The first feature is its 
subjective metric. The “exchange rate” of  concessions, to use the crude language of  voluntary 
transactions, depends on the relative value agents attribute to what they are yielding and is therefore 
internally generated. Specifically, it depends upon two sets of  evaluations: each party’s respective 
evaluation of  their loss and each party’s respective evaluation of  the other parties’ loss. The 
standard is “agent-relative” (Becker 2005, 26). What is being exchanged does not have equal value 
in absolute terms, but different agent-relative values. When it comes to its metric, the practice of  
compromise does not differ from business transactions in general. There is no “just price”. 
The second feature of  reciprocity-in-compromise is the nature of  what is being exchanged. 
Compromisers return loss for loss, sacrifice for sacrifice. Reciprocity is the norm that regulates the 
tentative adjustment of  these losses. A compromise begins with one party making a concession that 
has a self-inflicted cost. Following the norm of  reciprocity, the other party makes a concession to 
respond appropriately to the sacrifice made by the first agent. What is lost can be construed in 
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terms of  “opportunity costs”, aspirations that are foregone as a result of  choosing the path of  
compromise (Becker 2005, 28). 
The appropriate concession is likely to differ from both equal and in-kind returns. Given the 
subjective nature of  the assessment, some might in fact lose more than others in absolute terms. As 
such, compromise need not be about strict equivalency between concessions made, as the 
expression “splitting the difference” seems to entail. Concessions may greatly differ in kind—I 
concede to give more of  my time, while you concede to give more money. What matters is that the 
appropriate return approximates the self-inflicted loss of  the other party according to an agent-
relative evaluation.  
The norm of  reciprocity is at work in different types of  compromise. Consider a scenario where 
compromisers divide and allocate a disputed resource amongst themselves, be it a piece of  land, a 
number of  seats, or perhaps less typically, time share in space. An original example of  time-sharing 
compromise was indeed struck on March 1, 1998 between radio astronomers from the US-based 
National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center, and the satellite operator Motorola Inc.16 There was, 
at the time, a fear that a cellular telephone system called Iridium could interfere with the science 
of  radio astronomy, creating a clash between commercial and scientific interests. After what was 
described as “five years of  sometimes bitter negotiation”17, it was agreed that radio astronomers 
would benefit from protected hours (from 10 pm to 6 am Eastern Time) for conducting their 
observations, while they would refrain from scientific activity during peak telephone hours. This 
agreement was perceived by many as “a fair solution to the conflict between commercial 
communication interests and science”.18  
In this example, the reciprocal element is decisive in the perceived fairness of  the solution. It is 
because each party agreed to make a concession, refraining their use of  space in specific hours, 
that the distribution of  burdens seems fair. Note that the time-sharing is not equal, as radio 
astronomers only enjoy eight protected hours of  observation. A compromise need not split the 
difference equally. What matters is that the parties estimate that they have reached an 
approximation of  their self-inflicted costs. In relative terms, the distribution of  burdens is perceived 
as roughly equivalent.  
                                            
16 “Motorola and Astronomers Agree to a Time Share in Space”, The New York Times, March 20, 1998.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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Consider now a second scenario in which compromisers reconcile seemingly antagonistic 
demands in a collective solution, be they conflicting ideological claims, rationales of  justice, or the 
unlikely architectural combination between a medieval Gothic style with Baroque palazzo.19 St 
Paul’s Cathedral in London was described as the product of  a “good old English compromise” 
which “ensures that, even if  no one is ecstatically happy, at least no one is notably unhappy”.20 In 
more political terms, many laws are the product of  unlikely alliances and integrate conflicting 
ideological inputs. A law legalising abortion can nevertheless deny it public funding. A law 
enforcing compulsory education can leave a large space for home schooling. Such provisions in the 
law can be rationalised in terms of  justified limitations, but de facto they often result from the 
business of  compromise, the back and forth of  discussions and revisions, which produces legislative 
bills looking like normative patchworks.  
Reciprocity is present in this scenario as well. Each party must bear with the intrusion of  an 
undesired element in the agreed-upon solution. The reciprocal sacrifice is about not having it all, 
and accepting a hybrid arrangement which reflects the cooperative effort of  welcoming the 
unwanted. This effort should be perceived as roughly equivalent or at least proportionate.21   
Perhaps less intuitively, reciprocity is also at work in a third scenario, in which an alternative 
solution is substituted to the parties’ initial claims—what has been called “substitutive compromise” 
(Weinstock 2013). Not all conflicts allow for a fair division of  resources or an innovative 
combination of  ideas. In some cases, parties fiercely oppose any input from the other side. When 
no half-measure and no perfect blend is available, a “third way” can offer a plausible alternative to 
the parties’ initial claims. For example, secular wedding vows can work as a compelling option for 
an interreligious couple, not ready to surrender to the other’s religious tradition nor willing to 
organise an ecumenical ceremony. A somewhat similar strategy was adopted in the city of  
Outremont, in Canada (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 50). On October 10, 2000 a resolution was 
adopted to substitute the traditional prayer of  the town hall council with “a secular invocation”. 
This change of  procedure followed a complaint of  the Mouvement laïque québécois (MLQ) and aimed 
at transcending the sectarian practice of  a religious prayer, while keeping a public ritual adapted 
to a pluralistic context. It was agreed that the prayer will now consist in the mayor publicly reading 
                                            
19 Jonathan Glancey, “A very English Compromise”, The Observer, June 28, 1999.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Concession need not be equal in objective terms, but roughly equivalent or proportionate in subjective 
terms.  
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a text about prudent government. However, this “secular prayer” did not work as a compelling 
substitute for very long. In January 2017, the idea was abandoned and replaced by a minute of  
silence so that everyone “can refer to their own way of  looking at things in this new solemn 
moment”.22  
A substitutive compromise involves a reciprocal sacrifice insofar as it works as a “second-best” 
for the parties in presence. In the example of  the marriage vows, each partner would presumably 
rank first being married in one’s own religious faith. An ecumenical ceremony, mixing elements of  
the two traditions, is ranked last. The secular wedding vows appear as the second-best. In the 
example of  the substitutive prayer, the minute of  silence could presumably be a second-best in 
relation to sectarian traditional prayers, the latter being ranked first by individuals of  various faiths. 
We can venture that the “secular invocation” did not work because it was in fact ranked first by 
secular participants. To meet the reciprocal demand, the second-best option must involve a roughly 
equivalent or proportionate sacrifice on the part of  each party. Reciprocity-in-compromise trades 
sacrifices in light of  an endogenous exchange rate. Whether parties are seeking the equalisation of  
burdens or a relation of  proportionality is context-dependent.  
Now that I have provided a general account of  the underlying norm at work in a common 
social and political practice, I ought to say more about what makes reciprocity in compromise 
valuable. Surely, it is not merely about tit-for-tat, otherwise there would be no way to distinguish a 
commercial bargain with a reluctant yet generous exchange of  concessions.  
The value of  reciprocity-in-compromise is first and foremost expressive. Reciprocity is 
underpinned by an ethos of  mutual concern and the willingness to take seriously the other’s 
perspective and judgement (White 2003). The very exercise of  self-inflicted losses and mutual 
evaluation demands an active engagement with the other’s standpoint and involves a cooperative 
mindset. Being ready to compromise means being willing to accommodate at least some aspects of  
the other person’s views or being willing to discount one’s aspirations in light of  conflicting 
demands. The willingness to concede indicates a degree of  moral acknowledgment of  the 
opponent, as well as a level of  trust: any concession, especially the first one, is a risk to take. Meeting 
the demand of  reciprocity involves a cooperative game, in which parties successively run the risk 
of  a self-inflicted loss. In doing so, they persuasively express their concern for the interests of  others. 
                                            
22 I translate. Frédéric Lacroix-Couture, “Une minute de silence en début de Conseil à Outremont”, 
December 22, 2016. 
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In this sense, there is more to the practice of  reciprocal sacrifice than mere tit-for-tat. 
Compromising has intrinsic value. 
Reciprocal sacrifice also has instrumental value, which directly relates to the question of  
fairness.23 The norm of  reciprocity, which calls for an appropriate and proportionate return, gives 
normative guidance as to what constitutes a fair resolution. A breach of  reciprocity would be the 
recipe for unfair deals—and would likely fail to secure the consent of  the other parties. Reciprocity 
is by no means an infallible guide. Extrinsic considerations, such as the fairness of  the initial 
compromising position, can corrupt the process and impact the outcome. A compromise can be 
unfair in light of  a procedure-independent criterion of  fairness. Within the procedure, however, 
reciprocity serves fairness. It is by following the guidance of  this tacit norm that compromisers 
navigate the normative landscape of  concessions-making. The procedure is highly imperfect and 
the outcome inevitably disappointing. Yet it can generate a shared sense that a “fair solution” was 
achieved, as in the example of  the Motorola-astronomers agreement.  
Finally, the relationship-building aspect of  reciprocity has been praised and constitutes a 
valuable side effect of  compromise. Aristotle believed in the cohesive virtue of  reciprocity, that 
could hold a city together (Aristotle, Bartlett, and Collins 2011, 99). Alvin Gouldner argued that 
reciprocity contributes to the initiation and stabilisation of  relationships (Gouldner 1960). In the 
specific case of  compromise, the expectation of  reciprocity is an incentive to take the initiative of  
conceding. The return of  concession is not only useful to settle a conflict, but also to maintain a 
political relationship. In contrast, failures to reciprocate generate bitterness and resentment and 
endanger relationships. Free-riding, a breach of  reciprocity, is widely frowned upon as expressing 
a lack of  respect (White 2003, 62). The choice of  a procedure structures the political relationship 
beyond one single decision. 
A reciprocal sacrifice is valuable because of  what it expresses—mutual concern, the willingness 
to cooperate and to be other-regarding—, and for what it achieves, a shared sense of  fairness and 
relationship-building. One crucial ingredient of  reciprocity is the norm of  consent. Reciprocity 
implies consent, which has a twofold role in compromise, namely regulating the process and 
normatively grounding the outcome.  
 
                                            
23 On compromise and fairness, see Wendt (2018) and Jones and O’Flynn (2013).  
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IV. The Role of  Consent  
 
Within the norm of  reciprocity, consent aims to regulate the exchange of  concessions. The 
expectation of  consent structures the realm of  feasibility. In deliberating about the claims and 
concessions to make, each party has in mind that they must obtain the consent of  others. They 
may be tempted to exaggerate their claims in order to minimise their loss. But they know that they 
cannot ask for the sun, moon and stars, as unreasonable expectations are unlikely to be well 
received (and they might endanger the trust of  other parties). A breach of  reciprocity is likely to 
engender a failure to generate consent. Although concessions do not have to be strictly equivalent, 
consent is a useful safeguard against highly asymmetrical deals (although not infallible).  
The role of  consent appeared very vividly in the difficult negotiation between the Obama 
administration and the Catholic Bishops over contraception coverage. In 2012, the United States 
Conference of  Catholic Bishops rejected President Obama’s compromise plan on the coverage of  
birth control for employees of  Catholic organisations, such as hospitals and universities.24 The 
proposal appeared rather favourable to freedom of  conscience, as it exempted religious 
organisations from covering birth control for their employees. Women would instead get access to 
coverage through insurance companies. While the Bishops initially acknowledged “a first step in 
the right direction”25, they later deplored that the compromise plan had not been properly 
discussed and was presented as “a fait accompli”.26 Whatever the generosity of  the concession 
made, the norm of  reciprocity was not respected, and the Bishops felt disregarded. As a result, they 
withdrew their consent. About a year later, they rejected the proposal another time, challenging 
this time the significance of  the concessions made, especially in the specific case of  secular 
businesses whose owners have a religious objection against contraception coverage.27 As 
Archbishop Chaput expressed, “The White House has made no concessions to the religious 
conscience claims of  private businesses, and the whole spirit of  the ‘compromise’ is minimalist”.28 
                                            




27 Robert Pear, “Bishops Reject Birth Control Compromise”, New York Times, February 8, 2013.  
28 Ibid.  
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Again, consent is withdrawn because the sacrifice made by the other side fails to convince. Whether 
the Bishops themselves were indeed ready to concede remains to be seen.  
Consent authorises and blocks, but it also obliges us. In some circumstances, consent functions 
as “a normative rope whereby one binds oneself to another (Kleining 2009)”. Consenting to a deal 
is not merely acquiescing to is. Rather, it is an act of will that obligates the parties to one another. 
Their joint decision to bind themselves restricts their future options, as they are now bound to 
perform what has been agreed upon. Compromise etymologically means joint promise—a co-
promise (Fumurescu 2013, 4). The modern meaning of the term differs from its Latin origin, which 
referred to a dispute arbitrated by an impartial third-party, a compromissarius (Fumurescu 2013, 4). 
Yet the emphasis on promissory obligations remains relevant today, and accurately describes the 
conventional meaning given to compromise as a social practice.  
One account of promissory obligations appeals to a general moral principle according to which 
promises ought to be fulfilled when they have been made under certain specified empirical 
conditions. This is the approach endorsed by Thomas Scanlon (1998). In this view, the obligations 
arising from making promises and the wrongs of violating them fall into a wider category of moral 
duties, namely “what we owe to other people when we have led them to form expectations about 
our future conduct (Scanlon 1998, 296)”. The social practice of promise-making is merely “the 
means for creating such expectations (Scanlon 1998, 296)”. The normative force of a promise lies 
in moral principles that exist prior to any explicit or implicit agreement, such as the duty not to 
deceit. For instance, Scanlon’s Principle F (“principle of fidelity”) spells out conditions of 
voluntariness and mutual knowledge that a promise, or any form of agreement-making, should 
satisfy (Scanlon 1998, 304). If the conditions are fulfilled, it is wrong for one party to unilaterally 
rescind their commitment.  
This normative account of agreement-making has implications for theorising consent in 
compromise. In other words, if one endorses the idea that the moral force of compromise-making 
stems from a general moral principle akin to Principle F, it becomes necessary to specify the 
conditions that need to be obtained for consent to be valid. To acquire its moral force, certain 
empirical conditions must be satisfied (Kleining 2009). For examples, agents must be deemed 
competent to consent. Consent must be voluntary, free from coercion. Agents must be 
appropriately informed about the decision they make. Each condition opens a large discussion—
for instance, what forms of social pressure counts as coercion? Which omission counts as deceit?  
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Voluntariness and informational requirements are particularly relevant to the context of 
compromise. Unfair background conditions cast doubt on whether concessions were freely made. 
When asymmetries of power are high, subordinated agents may have little choice but to accept the 
deal of the powerful. If an agent deliberately omits a crucial information in negotiating a deal, an 
apparent compromise can turn out to be a case of deceit. In both cases, the very definition of the 
arrangement depends upon the validity of consent. Should consent be found invalid, the deal 
should not be labelled a “compromise”, as consent is essential to the definition of a compromise.  
To say that consent should be valid does not mean that a theory of compromise should only 
accommodate one specific conception of consent. I see my account of compromise as compatible 
with a range of normative conceptions. A more demanding definition of consent implies a narrower 
definition of compromise.  
Another account of promissory obligations relies on the notion of joint commitment and 
diverges from the latter view (Gilbert 1989, 1993, 2018). Margaret Gilbert’s theory of promise and 
agreement as “joint commitments” compellingly explains why compromise is mutually binding.29 
In her theory, the genesis of a promise is a collective act of will. Promisor and promisee, or parties 
to an agreement, co-construct the decision that bind them to one another. This collective 
commitment is not made of a simple aggregation of two or more simultaneous promises; rather, it 
is a jointly designed and agreed upon decision, defining a commonly defined set of obligations. 
Parties to an agreement are directly obligated vis-à-vis one another. They cannot rescind their 
commitment unilaterally.  
One need not appeal to a pre-existing general moral principle to embrace this view of promises 
and agreements as sui generis normative phenomena. A crucial upshot is that one is de facto obligated 
by a promise—and, by extension, by a compromise. A compromise obligates insofar as it stems 
from a collective act of will that defines a joint commitment.  
Yet the question of whether one is morally required to fulfil obligations set by a compromise is 
analytically distinct from the question of whether one is bound by it. There can be several reasons 
why, all things considered, morality can demand that we unilaterally relinquish a joint commitment. 
For instance, it might be the case that one has agreed to an immoral compromise, for instance a 
                                            
29 Margaret Gilbert is skeptical of the tendency among philosophers to interpret agreements as “mutual 
promise”. But she insists that promises and agreements are “close cousins” and they can both be 
accounted for in terms of joint commitment (Gilbert 1993, 2011).  
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compromise that involves harming a third party. Immoral compromises give countervailing 
reasons for not fulfilling one’s obligations vis-à-vis other parties to a compromise. As stated earlier, 
even a rightly conducted procedure does not guarantee that the outcome will be acceptable on 
procedure-independent grounds. Yet a joint commitment gives us powerful pro tanto reasons to 
abide by the terms of the agreement. Consent makes compromises morally binding.  
Reciprocity and consent thus endow compromise with a thin, but effective normative frame. 
Reciprocity expresses an ethos of  mutual concern, and allows for a fair resolution of  conflict. It 
also contributes to relationship-building. The way we treat our political opponent today matters for 
the continuation of  our relationship. Within reciprocity, consent works as a crucial safeguard 
against both unreasonable claims and disproportionate concessions. It generates mutual obligations 




Compromise is indeed a valuable way of  making decisions. We have compelling reasons to 
choose to compromise in face of  political and moral disagreement. By doing so, we express a 
concern for the other’s perspective and interest, a readiness to meet their demands half-way (or at 
least somewhere on the way), and an openness to integrate some of  their claims in an innovative 
combination. The sense that the burdens of  cooperation have been fairly shared reconciles us with 
the bastard nature of  the compromise solution. Our joint commitment binds us together and 
frames our relationship in a cooperative way. What makes compromise so valuable, I have argued, 
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